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1. INTRODUCTION 
During the last twenty five years the European Union (EU) has been enlarged with the 
successive waves of accession of 18 new member states, i.e. Greece in 1981, Spain and 
Portugal in 1986,  Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Malta and Cyprus in 2004 and finally Bulgaria and 
Romania in 2007.  The Single Market plan has been put into effect since 1992 and Monetary 
Union, with the introduction of a single currency (EURO), is also already realised.  An 
argument, related to European integration and the implementation of the Single Market Plan, 
was that the effects of economies of scale and increased specialisation will not spread equally 
over the member countries, and thus the less advanced areas may not receive significant 
benefits in terms of increased efficiency and welfare. «Instead it is claimed, the impact of 
economies of scale and of agglomeration effects,… will produce self-reinforcing dynamic 
effects-termed "polarisation" that accentuate rather than ameliorate regional imbalances of real 
incomes» (Robson, 1987, p. 74). Furthermore, «economies of scale and trade costs encourage 
the concentration of manufacturing production in countries that have good access to large 
markets» (Amiti, 1998a, p. 46).   
This study follows a macro-economic approach (Aliber, 1970; Froot and Stein, 1991; Grosse 
and Trevino, 1996; Dunning, 2002; Filippaios et al., 2004).  We apply a theoretical framework 
blending Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) motives of multinational enterprises (MNEs) and 
macro-economic factors of countries.  Similar explanations were proposed by Buckley and 
Ghauri (2004), Filippaios et al. (2004) and Sethi et al. (2003).  Our interest is on the 
restructuring of FDI activity within EU-15 during the last two decades, and especially before 
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and after the implementation of the Single Market Plan in 1992. 
Empirical evidence shows that indeed the European integration process changes the locational 
determinants.  Most importantly, though, it has a different effect on core and peripheral 
countries.  The behaviour of US FDI towards the EU has changed through the period under 
investigation, moving to a more decentralized approach. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides the relevant literature and 
addresses the question from an historical perspective.  In the next section, section 3, we build 
a theoretical framework and support our hypotheses by providing the relevant literature 
review.  In section 4, we give a brief description of the sample.  Section 5 discusses the 
econometric methods, provides a description of US FDI in EU during the last twenty years 
and presents the results and their interpretation. Finally, section 6 concludes. 
 
2. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE LITERATURE 
At the theoretical and empirical level there has been a long standing tradition of work aiming 
at measuring the significance of the determinants of US direct investment in the EU.  This 
tradition closely follows the changes, in terms of political and economic matters, that took 
place within the EU.  During the early period, the questions arising were related to the 
creation of European Economic Community (EEC).  It was membership in the EEC and its 
effect on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) attraction that was the core of the research agenda.  
The first effort examining US FDI1 in Europe was that of Scaperlanda in 1967.  This study, 
comparing the proportion of long term US FDI in EEC countries and non-EEC countries of 
Western Europe for the period 1951-1964, concluded that creation of the EEC did not 
reallocate international investment.   
                                                 
1 US companies' investment in Europe provided the context for a major early wave of studies of determinants of FDI.  For 
summaries and critiques of these see Dunning (1997a,b), Yannopoulos (1990) and Clegg (1996).  More recent extensions of 
analysis of this context include Barrel and Pain (1999a). 
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During the 1980s and the early 1990s, as the process of European integration evolved, the 
original question as posed in the 1960s and 1970s was further enriched.  It is the effect of the 
process of deepening the internal market and further economic integration on FDI that comes 
under investigation.  The seminal work of Culem (1988) investigated the bilateral flows of 
FDI among six industrialised countries for the period 1969-1982.  Her results showed that 
foreign investors prefer “faster growing markets… in relation with the home market of the 
investor” (p.893) and that high relative unit costs of labour discourage inward FDI.   
The accession of Greece in 1981 and of Spain and Portugal in 1985, gave rise to another set of 
studies stressing the prevalence of both cost and demand considerations.  Wheeler and Mody 
(1992) investigated factors attracting FDI related to agglomeration, i.e. infrastructure quality, 
degree of industrialisation, existing level of FDI, labour costs and market size.   
During the last decade, the creation of the common market enabled firms to capture and 
exploit economies of scale (Barrell and Pain, 1999a,b) .  During the whole period after 1992 
there was an intense restructuring of multinational activity provoking the centralisation of 
production in order to take advantage of the free-trade area.  The factors that mainly affected 
this reorganisation process were closely related to the relevant production and transaction 
costs and to country specific variables.  We can summarise this reorganisation activity in two 
forces: 
The first one is the realisation of economies of scale in a number of industries.  As Dunning 
(1997a) suggests, a wider market makes it possible to segregate various functions of an 
industry into specialised undertakings that will themselves constitute new industries.  The 
second reason is more dynamic and is put forward by Barell and Pain (1999b, p. 925) who 
argue: “The potential for agglomerations to attract new investments which then influence the 
growth process has important implications for national policies, as it means that the size of 
nations is to be determined in the process of European integration, not just taken as given.”  
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Finally, Davis and Weinstein (1999) suggested that economic geography could provide a 
substantial insight into production at a regional level, giving reasonable answers to the 
restructuring of multinational activities within EU.  The changes in multinational activity 
during this period are directly addressed by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004).  In their study they 
investigate three main events: the impact of the completion of the Single Market, the 
enlargement of 1995 and, finally, the agreements of EU with the Central and Eastern 
European Countries (CEECs).  They found positive effects on FDI attraction deriving from all 
three events.  In another study measuring the impact of increased integration on multinational 
activity, Clegg and Scott-Green (1999) suggest that “…increased economic integration is 
positively evaluated by enterprises, and our analysis of EC92 shows that the effects of 
European Integration on FDI can be significant.” In this study we further expand their 
argument. 
The question is then readdressed in a theoretical framework built by Neary (2002).  He argues 
that the reduction of internal barriers might have two distinct effects.  On the one hand it may 
lead to increased competition within the EU and thus force MNEs to relocate activities in an 
efficiency-seeking way (Dunning, 1993).  On the other hand, the dismantling of trade barriers 
may lead to a concentration of economic activity and production in certain regions and then 
from there serve the rest of the union.  In a similar way the analysis of Buch et al. (2003) 
studies the redirection of FDI in Europe from the Southern countries to the CEECs.  They 
conclude that there is no redistribution of FDI activity at this point. 
 
3. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES 
We build on three previous studies to formulate a theoretical framework that will enable us to 
provide straight and clear answers on the impact of the process of EU integration during the 
last two decades on the determinant factors of FDI attraction. 
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At the heart of the analysis are Buckley and Ghauri (2004) who declare that MNEs’ strategies 
“revolve around the ability of MNEs to subdivide their activities more precisely and to place 
them in the optimal location”.  A similar interpretation of MNEs’ strategies and of countries’ 
evolution of locational characteristics can be found in Sethi et al. (2003).  Their main 
argument is that by bringing together economy-wide factors and strategic motives of firms, 
undertaking FDI decisions, we can get a clear picture of the changing pattern of multinational 
activity.  In this paper we also follow closely the analysis by Filippaios et al. (2004) and 
address FDI as the way MNEs continuously expand and restructure their activities.  MNEs are 
configured as ‘dynamic differentiated networks’ in response to global competition and their 
need to achieve and maintain their competitive position.  This network of operations is subject 
to expansion to new markets, i.e. countries, regions, and to restructuring of already established 
subsidiaries and roles as the firm’s needs alter or host country’s characteristics are 
reinterpreted.  Various typologies of strategic imperatives have been proposed in the literature.  
Sethi et al. (2003) consider increased competition, search for new low-cost locations, firm’s 
rival moves and government actions.  Hejazi and Pauly (2003) discuss motivations in terms of 
market access, factor endowment differences and access to natural resources.  Here we use a 
tripartite typology of FDI motives following Behrman (1984) and Dunning (1993, 2000).  
This typology is closely related to the process of EU integration during the last two decades 
and to particular aspects of host countries. 
Originally, the first US FDI in the EU was motivated by the need of US firms to enter the 
“Fortress Europe” (Neary, 2002).  The firms wanted to take advantage of the dismantling of 
trade barriers within the EU.  This behaviour is closely related to the Market Seeking (MS) 
motivation of FDI.  EU markets were sufficiently prosperous to consume US products and, at 
the same time, the high levels of trade protection made it profitable to invest and serve the 
local or contiguous markets rather than export.  This MS behaviour has been challenged by 
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freer trade and the various multilateral agreements of EU with other countries.  Wallis (1968), 
D’Arge (1969), Scaperlanda and Mauer (1969), Schmitz (1970), Goldberg (1972) and 
Schmitz and Bieri (1972) further enriched the original question of reallocation of US FDI 
(Scaperlanda, 1967) by investigating which factors eventually determine FDI in Europe.  
Among the variables tested were tariff discrimination, market size and growth rates.  The 
results for the first decades following the Second World War were not consistent, changing 
from one study to another.  One of the first studies that extended the time period into the late 
seventies was performed by Scaperlanda and Balough (1983).  Market size and growth 
potential of the host economy now emerged as consistently significant among other factors.  
These early studies mainly elaborated the decision of US firms to invest in Europe based on 
the grounds of the integrated market and primarily the desire to get inside the tariff wall.  As 
the process of European Integration progresses we expect MS motives to remain of particular 
importance, especially for core countries which constitute the major markets.  In this study we 
use two measures of MS behaviour capturing primarily production aspects of the MS 
motivation2: 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) captures the most direct relation between the market size of 
a country and FDI.  A larger market, in terms of demand, makes the realisation of economies 
of scale in production more possible and thus favours FDI servicing rather than export 
(Venables 1999; Vernon, 1966).  Various studies use GDP as a core determinant in MNEs’ 
decision to invest with the underlying hypothesis of a positive sign (Braunerhjelm and 
Svenson, 1996; Cullem, 1988; Barell and Pain, 1996; Wheeler and Mody, 1992; Veugelers, 
1991).  This leads to our testable hypothesis: 
 
                                                 
2
 Alternatively someone could use consumer indicators of Market Seeking behaviour such as GDP per capita or 
Consumer Buying Power.  These indicators show a high correlation coefficient with the GDP and the GDP 
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H1a:  We expect a positive relationship between GDP and US FDI. 
 
Gross Domestic Product Growth Rate (GDPGR) acts complementary to the absolute market 
size (Cullem, 1988; Veugelers, 1991).  This variable captures the MS behaviour in a rather 
more long-term horizon.  High growth rates indicate the potential of the local economy both in 
terms of future market size as well as improved economic conditions.   
 
H1b: A positive relation between GDPGR and US FDI is hypothesised. 
 
At the same time this MS motivation was joined by a second one taking the form of 
Efficiency Seeking (ES).  This motivation constitutes the restructuring of FDI within EU.  The 
process of European integration and expansion created new opportunities for firms to upgrade 
or reinforce their competitive advantages.  Relocation of specific activities serves the main 
objective to produce cost efficiently.  These were primarily export-oriented activities from 
lower-cost locations, perhaps countries belonging to the European Periphery.  This constitutes 
the emergence of the ‘differentiated network’ (Filippaios et al. 2004). In this strand of 
literature, Cushman (1985,1987) studying US inflows and outflows with other industrialised 
countries, reported that “a rise in source country wages or cuts in its labour productivity 
encourages FDI out of that country” (Cushman 1985, p.181).  Similar explanations on FDI 
determinants were given by various studies published in the late 1980s or early 1990s (Pain, 
1993; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1990; Veugelers, 1991). In this paper we measure ES 
behaviour using the following variables: 
                                                                                                                                                        
growth rates thus imposing a high degree of collinearity to our estimations that could distort the results.  
Alternative estimations using those indicators provide similar explanations to those presented in the paper. 
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Compensation of employees (LCOST) and labour productivity in the business sector 
(LPROD) are at the heart of ES motives.  The relation between wages, productivity and FDI is 
clear (Pain, 1993).  Wage has been found to have a stable negative relation with FDI, while 
the opposite holds for productivity (Cushman, 1987).  Especially after the realisation of Single 
Market Plan, the increased competition within EU forced MNEs to restructure and relocate 
their operations in search of lower production costs.  These two variables represent a strongly 
attractive factor for ES FDI.  The inclusion of labour productivity in the business sector serves 
as a broader indicator of labour market conditions.  Our hypothesis is that LCOST will be 
negatively related with FDI representing the need for lower labour cost and thus cost 
efficiency, whilst LPROD will be positively related to FDI, accounting for better labour 
market conditions and quality of labour force.  The application of these two variables is very 
common in the FDI studies (Barrel and Pain, 1996, 1999a,b; Cullem, 1988; Wheeler and 
Mody, 1992; Veugelers, 1991) 
 
H2a: A negative relation exists between LCOST and US FDI. 
H2b: A positive relation exists between LPROD and US FDI. 
 
Openness (OPEN) as defined by exports over total trade, could be either substituting or 
complementing for FDI (Markusen 1984; Dunning, 1997a,b; Torstensson, 1998).  This 
variable, accompanied by the Relative Export Price Index (EXPRI), describes the 
competitiveness position of a country in terms of international trade and exposure.  Two 
dimensions of these variables need to be stressed here.  High level of competitiveness 
accompanied with price advantages can support FDI strategies aiming at wider markets than 
the country itself.  In the context of EU this can be translated as another aspect of MS 
behaviour.  Concentration of production in the most efficient location but still targeting the 
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whole region is the most pervasive depiction of this investment behaviour. 
 
H2c: A positive relation between OPEN and US FDI is expected. 
H2d: A positive relation between EXPRI and US FDI is expected. 
 
Both MS and ES motives can explain a large part of the restructuring in FDI within EU during 
the last two decades.  They represent ways in which MNEs can exploit their mature 
competitive technologies.  A third motivation, however, goes beyond traditional and mature 
products and technologies.  It focuses on the way FDI activities seek to secure their long-term 
competitiveness.  The increased dispersion of the sources from which firms can acquire inputs 
in the creative or learning process led to Knowledge Seeking (KS) motives.  Financing R&D 
and augmenting the quality of labour constitute one of the reinforcing elements of 
agglomeration.   Following Symeonides (1996) we also distinguished between « innovative 
inputs» and «innovative outputs», measuring the former with Business Expenditure on R&D 
(BERD) and the latter with the number of patents registered by each host-country (TRPAT).  
We consider patents as a more efficient measure of R&D activity, as it demonstrates the 
effective use of technological inputs such as R&D expenditures and/or number of scientific 
and technological personnel, etc.  We would expect US firms to not rely exclusively on home 
R&D resources, but to capitalize on the advance technological capabilities of host economies 
(Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1999).  
Total Patents are the direct indicator of the ability of the host economy to produce new 
knowledge and efficiently involve in research and development activities.  The ability of 
countries to generate knowledge and thus attract knowledge seeking MNEs is proposed by 
Kogut and Chang (1991) and Neven and Siotis (1996). 
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H3a: A positive relation is expected between TRPAT and US FDI. 
 
On the other hand Business Expenditure on R&D can be an indicator of local firms’ abilities 
in competing.  Increased competition might lead firms out of certain markets or countries.  
The effect of BERD on MNEs decisions is thus not a direct one.  A knowledge seeking MNE 
might invest in an economy with high BERD, aiming at externalities from local firms.  The 
relationship of BERD and FDI can therefore be either positive or negative. 
 
H3b: The relationship between BERD and US FDI can be either positive or negative. 
 
Finally to control for agglomeration factors and cultural differences between the different 
countries, we also augmented our model with two more variables. 
The lagged variable of FDI stock (FDIP[-1]) is capturing agglomeration factors related to the 
existence of previous FDI in the country or region under investigation.  There is a clear 
positive relation hypothesised between current and previous stock of FDI (Bellak and 
Cantwell, 2004). 
H4a: There is a strong positive relationship between the FDIP[-1] and US FDI. 
 
The percentage of pupils that learn English in the Lower and Upper Secondary 
education (CULT) is also included in the model.  Cultural similarities are an important factor 
for FDI decisions.  Edwards and Buckley (1998) showed that Australian manufacturers 
invested predominantly in the UK because of the perceived similarity to the Australian 
environment.  Culture comprises various aspects and can be fluid across time and space.  To 
capture the different dimensions, i.e. time and space, we included a language learning variable 
which functions as a proxy for cultural differences.  In a previous study Veugelers (1991) 
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found a positive influence of language on FDI decisions3. 
 
H4b: There is a positive relationship between CULT and US FDI. 
 
Finally our dependent variable FDIP captures the FDI position (stock) of US investors in 
country i at time t.  In the literature there is an ongoing debate as to whether stocks or flows 
should be used in order to capture the investors’ motivations.  In this paper we used the stock 
values for two basic reasons.  Firstly, due to the dynamic model we estimate we would like to 
have stock of FDI, which captures agglomeration aspects as well, rather than its changes from 
period to period.   The estimation method is better operationalised with the use of stocks as it 
produces first differences in order to provide the results.  A description of the econometric 











Where i=1,2,…,14 represents country i and t=1982,1983,…,2002 the time period. 
 
4. DATA SAMPLE DESCRIPTION  
Our sample of countries, i.e. hosts to US FDI, covers the first 15 members of the EU during 
the period investigated, from the early 1980s (1982) to the early 2000s (2002).  We intend to 
pursue a deeper insight into FDI decisions within the EU through distinguishing between core 
and peripheral groups of countries (in terms of differences in economic characteristics).4 The 
                                                 
3
 Another point that should be made here is related to our econometric technique.  Arellano-Bond estimator does 
not allow for time invariable variables thus we had to find a time varying measure of culture. 
4
 Some special cases were also examined to provide further support to our results and arguments and also test the 
results’ consistency.  Results for those cases alongside some arguments are presented in Appendix 1.  Nordic 
countries, i.e. Sweden and Finland, became members in 1995 thus we decided to estimate FDI determinants 
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peripheral group contains those EU member states that mainly participate in the European 
Structural Funds Programme (ESFP) and the Cohesion Funds Programme, i.e. Greece, Italy, 
Ireland, Portugal and Spain.  The dependent variable tested in the analysis is annual US direct 
investment stocks in individual EU countries5. 
Data was compiled from various issues of a number of Eurostat and OECD publications, 
including the 'Main Economic Indicators', 'Main Science and Technology Indicators', 
’International Trade and Competitiveness Indicators’, 'International Investment Statistics 
Yearbook' and Eurydice Database .  This range of publications and databases facilitated the 
coverage of the relevant economic variables and the extended time frame.  Table 1 
summarises the variables used and the relevant sources. 
 
Insert table 1 here. 
 
 
5. ECONOMETRIC TECHNIQUES, RESULTS AND INTERPRETATION 
5.a. Econometric Techniques 
The introduction of a lagged independent variable capturing agglomeration economies 
involves the problem of correlation of error terms with common specifications (fixed effects 
models) (Hsiao, 1986).  Then the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) is biased even for a 
moderate time period.  Consequently, one has to apply an instrumental variables estimation 
technique to sweep out the correlation problems.  Arellano and Bond (1991) suggest the use 
                                                                                                                                                        
specifically for the group including Denmark (Table A1.1) as well as for the EU by excluding the group (Table 
A1.3).  Also Germany, UK and Ireland due to their special relations with US investors might have an influence 
on our overall results.  We thus decided to report the results for EU Periphery, excluding Ireland for the period 
after 1992 and the results for Germany and UK for both time periods (Table A1.2).  For a discussion of the 
results please refer to Appendix 1. 
5
 Our sample covers the 15 members of EU during the period under investigation.  Due to data limitations on US 
FDI stocks, Belgium and Luxembourg were unified.  That left us with 14 cases. 
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of orthogonality conditions between lagged values of the dependent variable and the 
disturbance terms to obtain additional instruments.  They propose the use of a Generalised 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimator.  That being said, the GMM estimator is consistent if 
and only if there is no second-order serial correlation in the error term of the first-differenced 
equation. 
Two test were used, one for the second order serial correlation of the residuals, and a Sargan 
test (1958) of over-identifying restrictions assuring the validity of the instruments used.  The 
failure to reject the null hypothesis in both tests provides support for the model specification 
and the estimation method. 
The last issue concerns the high correlation of some variables, especially between the 
Research and Development variables.  We orthogonalised the variables to reduce the high 
correlation (Greene 1997, p.242).   
5.b. The distribution of US FDI in Europe during the last 20 years 
The geography of US investments has considerably changed during the last two decades 
within the European Union.  The whole process is dynamic and this fact is depicted both in 
the relative importance of selected countries in terms of US investors and in the continuous 
change in the locational determinants that attract investments.  We decided to map US 
investments at four specific points in time during the last twenty years, i.e.1982, 1990, 1998 
and 2002.  These four years represent the beginning, the middle and the end of our sample.  
The four maps clearly demonstrate a structural change in US investment behaviour towards 
Europe, especially after 1992.  According to a recent paper by Buckley (2004), cartography 
has a lot to offer in international business.  This study offers a direct application of 
cartography methodologies and supports parts of its analysis in the use of maps. 
Each map represents the relative US FDI stock as a percentage of total US FDI stock in 
Europe.  The map for 1982 (Figure 1), clearly reveals the existence of two major centres, UK 
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and Germany that dominate in terms of relative importance.  Furthermore, the rest of the core 
countries, i.e. France, Belgium-Luxembourg, the Netherlands and at that point of time Italy, 
form a hub.  The rest of the countries that today are part of EU then formed just a periphery in 
terms of relative position.  
 
Insert Figure 1 here. 
 
The picture is altered eight years later (Figure 2).   
 
Insert Figure 2 here. 
 
Three centres now exist. UK and Germany maintain their role and the Netherlands emerges as 
a significant partner.  We observe a more unifying core pattern, whilst Italy seems to deviate 
and loose relative importance.  Similar is the case for Spain and the rest of the rest of the 
peripheral countries that remain low in their share of US FDI position.  This might reflect the 
effects of the early nineties recession that primarily affected EU peripheral countries. 
The third map shows the existence of considerable differences in the late nineties (Figure 3).   
 
Insert Figure 3 here. 
 
United Kingdom, Germany and the Netherlands remain the centre of US investment position, 
but the role that the core European countries play is different in each case.  The picture 
exposes the existence of a more dispersed strategy from US investors.  France, Belgium-
Luxembourg and Italy seem to be of equal importance, whilst Ireland and Spain come forward 
as significant players from the European periphery. 
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This dispersed strategy is further exposed in the early 2000s. 
 
Insert Figure 4 here. 
 
A very clear case here is Ireland.  Ireland achieved the highest level of economic development 
among all European member states, especially during the nineties.  With Gross National 
Product at the 65% of EU average in the beginning of the decade, it has reached the EU 
average in the latest years.  This successful pace was accompanied by an increase in inward 
FDI Stock, which is nowadays the third largest in the EU, relative to each county’s GDP.  
Ireland followed a well-designed strategy towards attracting FDI, which resided in targeting 
specific MNEs, offering a stable tax environment with one of the lowest corporate tax rates, 
low cost and skilled labor and an English language speaking setting.  
We can draw various conclusions from these four imprints.  First of all, the role of UK and 
Germany is dominant in the relative position of US investors within EU.  Secondly, the 
relative importance of Ireland is not significant until the late nineties.  Ireland for the main 
period does not deviate from the rest of the peripheral countries.  Finally, there is clearly a 
structural change in US investments towards EU the last twenty years.  What began mainly as 
investments in two specific countries, UK and Germany, seems to transform into a more 
alienated behaviour. 
5.c. Results and Interpretation 
Regarding the identification of which factors determine the evolution in the country 
distribution of US FDI, we answer using a dual approach.  The first component is related with 
the locational determinants of US FDI during the last two decades.  The second is related to 
the linking of those locational determinants with FDI motivations of US firms towards EU 
countries.   
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Breaking up our sample into different regions, within the context of EU,  and different time 
periods, we present evidence on two issues.  Firstly, whether the process of integration did 
affect the FDI motives and, secondly, if the restructuring of FDI was towards further 
centralization, as a response to the realisation of economies of scale in production, or towards 
further regionalisation as a response to the increased competition in EU core countries and the 
need for cost efficiency. 
We present our results in the following way.  Firstly, we present results for the whole of the 
EU and then for the EU Core and EU Periphery and then secondly results for two basic time 
periods. The first period is prior to the realisation of SMP and the second one after the 
realisation. 
5.c.1. EU Total, EU Core and EU Periphery 
Results for the whole of the EU during the last twenty years reveal the importance of 
agglomeration economies by the positive and statistically significant sign of the FDIP lagged 
value.  Growth of the economy as well as costs of production and labour productivity also 
emerge as significant factors keeping their hypothesised signs, i.e. positive relation with 
GDPGR, negative relation with labour cost (LCOST) and positive relation with labour 
productivity (LPROD) in the business sector.  In this respect the results are similar to those 
obtained by Scaperlanda and Balough (1983), Culem (1988) and Cushman (1985,1987)  The 
positive and statistically significant sign of relative export price index (EXPRI) discloses the 
intention of US investors to commit to competitive locations through the whole period.   
 
Insert table 2 here 
 
Results for the EU CORE countries remain the same as for total EU, reflecting the dominant 
effect of locational factors from EU Core countries in the whole region.  In this case, though, 
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both labour costs and the competitiveness of local production, captured by the export price 
index variable, are gaining significance.  The cultural variable emerges as a positive and 
significant factor capturing the US investors’ intention to commit resources to culturally 
similar countries. Our results confirm the positive effect of language as a proxy for culture as 
already measured by Veugelers (1991).  The results nevertheless are dominated by the lagged 
FDI variable, which is positive and highly statistically significant as in Barell and Pain 
(1997b).   
Results for the EU Periphery for the whole period reveal, on the other hand, a different story.  
Whilst agglomeration factors still play a significant role, market size as measured by GDP is 
significant for the first time.  This fact is accompanied by the significance of factors capturing 
labour market conditions.  The main difference from EU Core countries comes from the two 
variables capturing knowledge seeking behaviour.  Both of them are negatively signed and 
statistically significant suggesting that the sole intention of US investors entering peripheral 
EU markets is to produce mature products and distribute them locally.  This picture remains 
unchanged even if we split up the sample into pre and post 1992 period, supporting the 
hypothesis that the creation of the Single Market did not relocate investments from core 
countries to periphery countries within the EU.  The actual relocation took place within the 
EU core.  This result validates the theoretical and empirical argumentation of earlier studies 
(Davies and Weinsten, 1999; Neary, 2002; Egger and Pfaffermayr, 2004) 
 
5.c.2. EU Total, EU Core and EU Periphery (1982-1991 and 1992-2002) 
Our division of the sample to pre and post 1992 period exposes hidden patterns to US 
investment behaviour before and after the realisation of the Single Market Plan.  Only three 
factors emerge as statistically significant for the whole EU before 1992.  Agglomeration 
economies captured by the FDI lagged value, the absolute size of the European markets and 
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the BERD variables are positive and statistically significant, revealing the intention of US 
investors to capitalise on knowledge creation of EU in total.  These results are a mirroring 
image of the results reported by Gorg and Ruane (1999).  In their analysis they conclude that 
country market size is still an important location factor for FDI attraction.  Similar results can 
be found in various studies (Pain, 1993; Papanastassiou and Pearce, 1990). Results are 
different for the post 1992 period.  Growth of EU countries is positive and statistically 
significant, reinforcing Barell and Pain’s (1999a,b) suggestion that the size of EU economies 
in the process of European integration is to be determined and not taken as given.  Labour cost 
and labour productivity considerations are also coming forward as strongly determining 
factors of FDI behaviour.  The BERD variable changes sign but is still significant, disclosing 
a change in the knowledge seeking behaviour of US investors.     
 
Insert table 3 here 
 
Results for the EU core sub-samples augment the picture.  The pre-1992 period is 
characterised by the search for large, but at the same time slowly growing, markets as shown 
in the positive and statistically significant sign of GDP and the negatively signed GDPGR.  
Growth in the local markets increases competition from local firms and thus decreases FDI.  
Cost considerations are important only when it comes to the actual labour cost and this fact is 
mirrored in the negative and statistically sign of LCOST.  Local competitiveness captured by 
OPEN acts as a barrier for US investors reinforcing our previous argument on local firms’ 
competition.  The main motive for US firms during the pre -1992 period was to get inside the 
EU, primarily as a reaction to their fears for the creation of the ‘Fortress Europe’.  In this 
context competitiveness of the local economy, mirroring the existence of competitive local 
firms is reducing FDI.   
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The realisation of SMP in 1992 changed the behaviour of US investors.  Past FDI is still a 
strong attracting factor but only cost considerations remain important in the investment 
behaviour.  These cost considerations are primarily captured by LCOST which is negatively 
signed and significant.  On the other hand EXPRI becomes positive and significant signalling 
the investors’ behavioural change.  The need to find cost effective locations within the context 
of EU and especially within EU core countries, and from there serve the integrated market is 
clearly revealed.  Our results come into line with Clegg and Scott-Green (1999) who suggest 
that enterprises appraise positively the process of economic integration. 
The impact of SMP in the case of EU Periphery is not different.  The pattern of US investment 
is again changing between pre and post 1992 periods.  Agglomeration factors measured by the 
already established FDI are the most influential factor for both time periods. In the case of EU 
periphery the existence of previous FDI acts as an evaluation of the local market for future 
FDI decisions. Both efficiency seeking variables, i.e. labour costs and labour productivity 
emerge as significant factors in the post- 1992 period.  Also both knowledge seeking variables 
are negatively signed and statistically significant for post -1992 period.  An interesting result 
also comes into the light.  Our cultural differences proxy has a negative and statistically 
significant sign, reinforcing the dominant position of efficiency seeking motives of FDI 
located in periphery.  The FDI undertaken is not catering to the local market, thus MS 
variables turn out insignificant and the cultural variable is negative.  Previous studies (Grosse 
and Trevino, 1996) have found similar results for cultural proxies. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this paper was to present the change in locational determinants of US FDI in 
the European Union over the last two decades, i.e., 1982-2002 as a result of the ongoing 
process of European integration.   The emphasis was placed on EU-15, as the EU-core 
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countries have been the traditional recipients of US FDI since the Second World War and the 
leaders in a process that led to a unified European market. 
One of the main findings of the paper is that despite the process towards a single market, US 
investors’ behaviour gradually changed from a centralised to a decentralised allocation of 
investment.  In the beginning of the period under investigation, two major attracting centres of 
US FDI have been depicted, i.e. UK and Germany.  This changed gradually to a more 
dispersed interest, especially towards other core European countries.  This definitely reflects 
the positive aspects of European Union integration with respect to the core countries as US 
investors do not any more locate their investments in UK and Germany but they also consider 
the rest of the core countries as potential locations.  In the late nineties this is further depicted 
by the varied relative importance of different core countries in the total US FDI in Europe.  
Similar are the results of Braunerhjelm and Oxelheim (2000).  We also find a significant 
change in investors’ behaviour after the creation of the Singe Market.  There is, thus, a 
significant effect of EU integration within core at the beginning of the period under 
examination and until the full implementation of the Single Market Plan.  The picture after the 
implementation, i.e. in the late nineties and after 2000 is even more optimistic on the effect of 
the single market towards economic convergence and integration.  As one can see from 
Figures 3 and 4 there is a convergence even between the core and periphery countries with 
respect to US FDI attraction.  That finding though needed further examination in order to 
identify the specific motives of US investors when investing in different EU countries. 
It was the purpose of this paper to provide evidence on that question as well.  We explained 
those location determinants that led to this gradual change and relate them to specific changes 
within the EU. The MNEs took on a strategic approach to the region.  This strategic approach 
and its change are clearly identified in Pearce and Papanastassiou (1997).  The results suggest 
that the US FDI pattern varies among different groups of countries within the EU. It is 
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obvious that US FDI directed to each of the geographical areas, i.e. EU-Core and EU-
Periphery, are not determined by a unique set of factors.  The process of EU integration, and 
especially the effect of implementation of Single Market Plan in 1992, changed US investor’s 
behaviour towards EU. 
Agglomeration factors, such as already established FDI, market size in some cases, qualified 
and productive labour capturing the cost efficiency of production in different EU areas and 
local-firm competitiveness seem to dominate in the process of location choice of US 
investors. 
Different characteristics in the strategic motivations of US MNEs reinforce our findings, not 
only in regard to the idiosyncratic behaviour of certain location factors but also with respect to 
the impact of the process of European Integration. Our study reinforces the results obtained by 
Mold (2003).  In our study we use an extended explanatory framework, incorporating in the 
analysis agglomeration factors and cultural variables.  This enables us to give a definite 
answer to the main question:  Did the implementation of the Single Market have an effect on 
the behaviour of US investors?  Yes it had.  It further reinforced the integration aspects of the 
Single Market Plan by revealing and enhancing each market’s distinct characteristics and 
advantages. 
In concluding, future research could expand to the new member states that joined the EU in 
2004 onwards and could provide sectoral or country-regional evidence, reinforcing this 
tendency of US investors. Furthermore, it would be interesting to relate US outward FDI with 
inward US FDI from European Union countries, in order to explore in depth the different 
factors that drive the relative competitiveness of EU-US.  Finally, an examination of the 
performance of US subsidiaries in their respective host-markets could provide supporting 
evidence of this change from a microeconomic perspective.  
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Figure 1. US FDI Position 1982 (As percentage of total US position in EU) 
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Figure 2. US FDI Position in 1990 (As percentage of total US position in EU) 
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Figure 3. US FDI Position in 1998 (As percentage of total US position in EU) 
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Figure 4. US FDI Position in 2002 (As percentage of total US position in EU) 
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Table 1. Description of Variables 
Variable Description Source 
FDIP Direct Investment Position by Country, (Constant 
prices and exchange rates 1990), bn. US$  
OECD International Investment Statistics 
Yearbook 
GDP GDP, (Constant prices and exchange rates 1990), 
bn. US$ 
OECD Main Economic Indicators 
GDPGR GDP Growth, Percentage change Authors’ Calculations 
LCOST Compensation of Employees, (Constant prices and 
exchange rates 1990), US$ 
OECD Main Economic Indicators 
LPROD Labour Productivity in the business sector, Index 
 
OECD Main Economic Indicators 
OPEN Exports / (Exports+Imports), (Constant prices and 
exchange rates 1990), US$ 
OECD International Trade and Competitiveness 
Indicators and Authors’ Calculations 
EXPRI Relative price of exported goods and services, 
Index 
 
OECD International Trade and Competitiveness 
Indicators 
BERD Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D – BERD, 
(Constant prices and exchange rates 1990), mil. 
PPP US$ 
OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
TRPAT Number of "triadic" patent families, (priority year) OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators 
CULT Percentage of pupil that learn English in Lower and 
Upper Secondary Education (ISCED2/3, 
International Standard Classification of Education) 
Eurydice Database, The information Network on 
Education in Europe 
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Table 2. EU Total, EU Core and EU Periphery (1982 – 2002) 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Stock 
Arellano – Bond Dynamic Panel Data estimation with robust standard errors. 
 EU TOTAL EU CORE 
EU 
PERIPHERY 
FDIP(-1) 1.0365*** 1.0238*** 0.8767*** 
 (60.51) (35.16) (25.80) 
GDP 0.0119 0.0070 0.0132** 
 (1.09) (0.94) (2.47) 
GDPGR 1.8729* 1.0831 2.4595 
 (1.84) (0.73) (0.91) 
LCOST -0.0156* -0.0123* -0.0375*** 
 (-1.78) (-1.90) (-4.73) 
LPROD 0.0632** 0.0577** 0.2769*** 
 (2.37) (2.41) (10.48) 
OPEN 1.3327 5.7499 -9.5218 
 (0.83) (0.03) (-1.06) 
EXPRI 9.8619** 9.0815*** -2.5983 
 (2.35) (2.68) (-1.29) 
BERD -1.2051 -1.4687 -5.2979*** 
 (-1.16) (-1.55) (-6.20) 
TRPAT -1.4189 -1.2580 -3.8981*** 
 (0.01) (-0.22) (-7.34) 
CULT 1.1350 3.6795* -2.3855*** 
 (1.36) (1.91) (-4.79) 
    
Observations 241 160 81 
Wald test 560.85 398.58 60.59 
Sargan test 228.32 153.52 61.40 
m2 -1.48 -1.59 2.13 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Table 3. EU Total, EU Core and EU Periphery (1982 – 1991, 1992 – 2002) 
Dependent Variable: Foreign Direct Investment Stock 















FDIP(-1) 0.9901*** 1.0141*** 0.8070*** 0.9836*** 0.2838** 0.7114*** 
 (25.21) (37.81) (6.70) (18.67) (2.40) (5.93) 
GDP 0.0314* 0.0054 0.0443** -0.0026 0.0014 -0.0161 
 (1.68) (0.37) (2.39) (-0.14) (0.07) (-0.72) 
GDPGR -1.4653 2.7600* -8.5437* 2.7385 9.0379 -4.5395 
 (-0.85) (1.92) (-1.89) (1.29) (0.63) (-0.32) 
LCOST -0.0078 -0.0123* -0.0191* -0.0052 0.0294 -0.0151** 
 (-0.92) (-1.77) (-1.68) (-0.73) (1.44) (-2.04) 
LPROD 0.1059 0.0590** 0.0855 0.0386 0.0207 0.8003** 
 (1.29) (2.45) (1.27) (1.45) (0.63) (2.18) 
OPEN 6.1203 -2.7268 -9.9930*** 10.4919 5.9224 -2.7679 
 (0.59) (-0.14) (-3.04) (0.31) (1.49) (-1.05) 
EXPRI -2.2665 1.1531 -0.4845 1.7517* 3.3380 -4.4794 
 (-0.50) (1.49) (-1.26) (1.63) (1.46) (-0.99) 
BERD 4.2039** -2.5684** 1.5253 -3.5803* -2.8815* -8.2066** 
 (2.21) (-2.50) (0.76) (-1.87) (-1.76) (-2.38) 
TRPAT 1.4996 -2.1774 2.9306 -5.0992 -2.3001 -7.0654*** 
 (0.65) (-0.53) (0.16) (-1.41) (-1.47) (-3.21) 
CULT -0.9947 1.0004 1.7632 6.4868 -6.6906 -1.2903** 
 (-0.02) (1.19) (0.90) (1.34) (-1.66) (-2.03) 
       
Observations 91 150 61 99 30 51 
Wald test 62.89 220.36 49.26 140.95 27.98 24.56 
Sargan test 64.39 139.57 40.03 91.66 19.06 34.79 
m2 2.93 -1.67 2.71 -1.70 -1.37 1.56 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Appendix 1. Special Cases within the EU Context 
The European Union has changed considerably during the years covered by our sample.  It is thus 
important to further split our country sample for two main reasons.  First, to check different motives 
in sub-groups of the EU-core and the EU-periphery and second to verify the robustness of our 
previous results.  The first group of countries we considered is the three Nordic countries.  Two of 
them, namely Sweden and Finland, became EU members in 1995.  Those two, accompanied by 
Denmark form a distinct group of countries.  Results for the whole period as well as for the two 
time periods, pre and post 1992 are presented in table A1.1.  
The initial sources of FDI were associated with abundant natural resources.  But there are a 
considerable number of Swedish MNEs that were born before the World War I.  The Swedish case 
shares much in common with the other two Scandinavian countries.  Their sources of competitive 
advantage are the increased Research & Development expenditures, the fast growth of their MNEs 
and their decentralized R&D strategy. 
The first striking result is the low significance of agglomeration factors captured by previous FDI 
stock.  Especially when breaking up the sample the FDI turns out insignificant.  The second 
important result is the behaviour of market seeking variables.  The absolute size of the market, as 
measured by the GDP, changes sign between the two periods turning from negative to positive.  
Rather contradictory are moreover the results coming from the labour market conditions variables.  
The high level of wages does not divert US investors as we would expect.  The existence of high 
quality and well qualified labour force might be a potential answer to that point.  The only two 
variables that follow the EU-core patterns are those related to the competitiveness of the local 
economy and the future growth of the market.  The factors influencing US FDI decisions, for the 
period after 1992, resemble closely to those of EU-core countries. 
Another group that needs further examination is the group of EU periphery countries especially after 
US OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EU AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET:   
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A COHESIVE FRAMEWORK 
 37 
1992.  The case of Ireland is different from the rest of peripheral countries, especially when it comes 
to US investment.  Results for the EU Periphery without Ireland for the post 1992 period are 
presented in table A1.2.   
The productivity effects as well as the agglomeration factors do not exist when we exclude Ireland 
from the Periphery group. 
Finally some more different group specifications were tested.  First, EU Core without Nordic 
countries and Austria and second United Kingdom and Germany as a distinct group within EU Core 
were tested.  The results obtained do not change the general picture of US investor behaviour.  
 
Table A1.1. Nordic Countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and Time Periods 
 NORDIC NORDIC<1992 NORDIC >=1992 
FDIP(-1) 0.2617*** 1.0783** -0.1101*** 
 (4.14) (5.03) (-3.21) 
GDP -0.0386*** -0.0050 -0.0415** 
 (-4.17) (-0.27) (-2.70) 
GDPGR 2.8416** 9.7676** 2.4974** 
 (2.49) (3.54) (2.28) 
LCOST -0.0005 0.0073*** 0.0359*** 
 (-0.12) (7.33) (3.40) 
LPROD 0.0305** -0.0231*** -0.0265** 
 (2.65) (-5.03) (-2.54) 
OPEN 4.0424 -5.7502 4.7050 
 (1.04) (-0.34) (1.41) 
EXPRI 5.6440 -2.1634*** 1.5391 
 (0.35) (-7.61) (0.83) 
BERD -2.3477 7.2054** -1.6558 
 (-1.14) (3.74) (-0.69) 
TRPAT -9.5443*** -2.7202 -6.7624 
 (-2.93) (-0.39) (-1.65) 
CULT -2.1969 1.2714* -3.6713 
 (-1.06) (2.47) (-1.60) 
    
Observations 46 13 33 
Wald test 11.32 11.56 8.56 
Sargan test 37.71 2.16 25.84 
m2 -0.95 0.57 -2.42 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Table A1.2. Special Groups. EU Periphery after 1992 with Ireland excluded, UK and Germany only 
for the two time periods. 
 






FDIP(-1) 0.2558 0.6423*** 0.5851*** 
 (0.86) (5.25) (22.64) 
GDP 0.0513*** 0.0906* 0.0416*** 
 (6.13) (1.84) (4.88) 
GDPGR 2.0429 -6.3327 -5.0590* 
 (1.26) (-1.02) (-1.96) 
LCOST 0.0111 -0.1634*** -0.3126*** 
 (0.27) (-47.66) (-3.84) 
LPROD -1.1135* -0.4761 2.2108 
 (-1.79) (-0.29) (1.08) 
OPEN 9.3456 -1.7622 -4.1776*** 
 (0.53) (-0.83) (-4.86) 
EXPRI -7.7588* 3.9323*** 8.0258*** 
 (-1.83) (2.89) (26.82) 
BERD -1.2889 -2.4961** -3.7134*** 
 (-0.68) (-2.08) (-6.25) 
TRPAT -1.8757* -2.2836 -6.9318*** 
 (-2.73) (-1.08) (-4.64) 
CULT 1.0431 2.0828*** 3.9233*** 
 (0.97) (13.59) (9.64) 
    
Observations 40 27 30 
Wald test 20.96 18.56 23.20 
Sargan test 32.52 13.83 14.39 
m2 -1.73 -0.70 -0.45 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Table A1.3. EU Core excluding Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and Time 
Periods 
 
EU CORE (NOT 
NORDIC) 
EU CORE (NOT 
NORDIC)<1992 
EU CORE (NOT 
NORDIC)>=1992 
FDIP(-1) 1.0136*** 0.8210*** 0.9361*** 
 (22.99) (4.70) (10.13) 
GDP 0.0578* 0.0694*** 0.0310 
 (1.69) (3.67) (0.83) 
GDPGR -9.1592 -1.0065* 1.7211 
 (-0.30) (-1.89) (0.52) 
LCOST -0.0804* -0.0732** -0.0825 
 (-1.66) (-2.56) (-1.25) 
LPROD -0.0886 0.1196 -0.1049 
 (-0.47) (0.40) (-0.28) 
OPEN 3.1406 -1.2636*** -3.0458 
 (0.95) (-6.26) (-0.34) 
EXPRI 1.5645** 4.6224 3.2904*** 
 (2.17) (0.15) (2.88) 
BERD -2.5689 1.2404 -8.9607 
 (-1.04) (0.29) (-1.46) 
TRPAT -1.8258 -1.2605 -9.7979 
 (-0.26) (-0.75) (-0.95) 
CULT 4.0460** 1.7089 1.1243*** 
 (2.30) (0.82) (1.83) 
    
Observations 114 48 66 
Wald test 283.65 35.62 90.53 
Sargan test 105.54 60.35 57.10 
m2 -1.61 1.54 -1.53 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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 Table A1.4. EU Core excluding Nordic countries (Sweden, Finland and Denmark) and Austria 
 
EU CORE NOT 
NOR & AUSTRIA 
EU CORE NOT NOR & 
AUSTRIA<1992 
EU CORE NOT NOR & 
AUSTRIA>=1992 
FDIP(-1) 1.0029*** 0.7707*** 0.8847*** 
 (24.12) (4.29) (7.89) 
GDP 0.0501 0.0759*** 0.0262 
 (1.47) (3.64) (1.09) 
GDPGR -7.9761 -1.1521* 1.4639 
 (-0.25) (-1.97) (0.75) 
LCOST -0.0661 -0.0762*** -0.0749 
 (-1.43) (-2.89) (-1.34) 
LPROD 0.1325 0.0300 0.5276 
 (0.69) (0.11) (0.51) 
OPEN 1.6082 -1.2668*** -7.1311 
 (0.44) (-5.46) (-0.62) 
EXPRI 1.1674 1.5356 3.1624* 
 (1.44) (0.25) (1.81) 
BERD -1.1037 -2.4849 -7.6991 
 (-0.49) (-0.06) (-0.90) 
TRPAT -6.4486 -1.1398 -1.0261 
 (-0.08) (-0.63) (-0.65) 
CULT 5.2813*** 2.2031 1.7930** 
 (3.13) (0.89) (2.33) 
    
Observations 95 40 55 
Wald test 206.56 28.69 68.36 
Sargan test 86.72 23.14 46.74 
m2 -1.44 2.71 -1.27 
t-statistics in parenthesis 
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at 10% 
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Appendix 2. Formulation of the Im, Pesharan, Shin test (1997) and Stationarity Results 
Before proceeding with the empirical evidence, it is important to clarify vital technical issues.  The 
first issue concerns the stationarity of time series. Although recent econometric literature (Philips 
and Moon, 2000) shows that when using panel datasets the regressions are usually not spurious, 
because the cross sectional element removes all the noise, the majority of these studies refer to large 
datasets both on the cross sectional and the time series dimension.  In this study, neither the time 
span nor the cross-section dimension of the dataset used are large enough to provide us with 
confidence that we do not have any kind of problem, and thus we decided to test for unit roots as a 
first step.  Testing for unit roots in panels is relatively recent and both the power as well as the 
accuracy of different tests is still at the heart of the research agenda.  We decided to test for the 
existence of a unit root in our economic series, using the Im, Pesaran Shin (1997) test (IPS)6.   This 
test was mainly chosen for two reasons.  Firstly, it allows for heterogeneity across the individual i’s, 
in our case countries, and moreover the IPS t-bar test has the most stable size amongst different 
panel unit roots sets (Choi, 1999). 
a. Test Formulation 
More precisely the test is constructed as follows: 
Consider the model: 
1 , 1,..., ; 1,...,it i it it ity y z u i N t T        (1) 
Where zit is the fixed effects and 
1
ip
it ij it j itj
u u   (2), that means that uit are serially correlated 
with different serial correlation properties across cross-sectional units.  We combine the two 




it i it ij it j it it
j
y y y z    

     (3) 
The null hypothesis is 0 : 1iH    
                                                 
6
 The construction of IPS test is presented in Appendix 2. 
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For all i and the alternative is : 1iH    for at least one i. The IPS t-bar statistic is defined as the 










  where it is the individual t-statistic of testing the H0 in (3).  Using some manipulation
7 
we get that: 















The values for [ | 1] and [ | 1]iT i iT iE t Var t    have been computed by IPS using simulations 
techniques for different values of T and pi’s. 
b. Stationarity tests 
The results of the IPS test for the full sample and the two European sub-samples presented in tables 
4 to 6 show no evidence of the existence of a unit root. 
 
Insert table A2.1 here 
Insert table A2.2 here 
 
Insert table A2.3 here 
 
The results showed that we cannot accept the null hypothesis of the existence of a unit root and so 
we proceeded to the second stage using Arellano Bond (1991) dynamic panel fixed effects 
estimation methods.  The aim of this second step was to shed some light on the locational 
determinants of US FDI during the period 1982-2002. 
                                                 
7 Using the properties of the residuals and the Lindeberg-Levy central limit theorem. 
US OUTWARD FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN THE EU AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SINGLE MARKET:   
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM A COHESIVE FRAMEWORK 
 43 
 
Table  A2.1. Im, Pesharan, Shin Unit Root Test (EU Sample) 
 
Series Lags t-bar Psi (t-bar) Prob.8 Obs. 
FDIP 1 1.18 9.63 0.00 271 
GDP 1 -0.53 3.98 0.00 271 
GDPGR 1 -2.31 -3.09 0.00 257 
LCOST 1 -0.47 3.90 0.00 271 
LPROD 1 0.56 8.37 0.00 271 
OPEN 2 -1.66 -0.87 0.19 262 
EXPRI 4 -1.16 0.74 0.22 244 
BERD 3 -1.11 1.25 0.11 253 
TRPAT 4 -1.19 0.60 0.27 244 
CULT 6 -1.67 -1.36 0.08 226 
 
Table  A2.2. Im, Pesharan, Shin Unit Root Test (EU Core Sample) 
 
Series Lags t-bar Psi (t-bar) Prob.9 Obs. 
FDIP 1 1.39 8.27 0.00 174 
GDP 1 -0.53 3.17 0.00 174 
GDPGR 1 -2.55 -3.24 0.00 165 
LCOST 2 0.19 4.85 0.00 168 
LPROD 1 0.54 6.62 0.00 174 
OPEN 3 -1.10 1.03 0.15 162 
EXPRI 3 -1.80 -1.11 0.13 162 
BERD 2 -2.07 -1.98 0.02 168 
TRPAT 2 -1.64 -0.63 0.27 168 
CULT 6 -1.54 -0.72 0.26 144 
 
Table  A2.3. Im, Pesharan, Shin Unit Root Test (EU Periphery Sample) 
 
Series Lags t-bar Psi (t-bar) Prob.10 Obs. 
FDIP 1 -0.18 2.88 0.00 100 
GDP 1 -0.26 3.02 0.00 100 
GDPGR 2 -2.58 -2.61 0.01 95 
LCOST 1 0.46 4.26 0.00 100 
LPROD 1 -0.06 3.51 0.00 100 
OPEN 4 -1.68 -0.72 0.23 85 
EXPRI 2 -2.18 -1.74 0.04 95 
BERD 1 -1.27 0.59 0.28 100 
TRPAT 1 -1.36 0.34 0.37 100 
CULT 7 -0.96 0.64 0.73 100 
                                                 
8
 The critical values for 10%, 5% and 1% are –1.82 , -1.90 and –2.07 respectively. 
9
 The critical values for 10%, 5% and 1% are –1.95 , -2.08 and –2.32 respectively. 
10
 The critical values for 10%, 5% and 1% are –2.04 , -2.18 and –2.46 respectively. 
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Appendix 3. Basic statistics and Correlation matrix 
Basic Statistics 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
FDIP 291 20368 37473 87 255391 
GDP 294 541050 551487 39144 2063432 
GDPGR 280 0.027 0.023 -0.064 0.156 
LCOST 275 299725 309330 3138 1345153 
LPROD 294 83412 121311 10996 502929 
OPEN 294 0.504 0.036 0.403 0.631 
EXPRI 294 111.269 11.965 80.934 137.229 
BERD 294 5892 7801 53 33934 
TRPAT 291 773 1212 0 5988 
CULT 294 88.72 17.54 28.09 100 
 
Correlation Table 
 FDIP GDP GDPGR LCOST LPROD COMP EXPRI BERD TRPAT CULT 
FDIP 1.00          
GDP 0.47* 1.00         
GDPGR 0.01 -0.09 1.00        
LCOST 0.23* 0.56* -0.14* 1.00       
LPROD -0.16* -0.26* -0.08 0.60* 1.00      
OPEN 0.05 0.07 0.11 0.23* 0.28* 1.00     
EXPRI -0.26* -0.18 0.01 -0.12 -0.05 -0.46* 1.00    
BERD -0.55* -0.25* 0.03 -0.06 0.19* -0.07 0.01 1.00   
TRPAT -0.36* -0.49* -0.01 -0.17* 0.12* 0.02 0.28* -0.08 1.00  
CULT 0.37* 0.09* 0.24* 0.26* 0.21* 0.24* -0.06 0.04 -0.17* 1.00 
* denotes significance at 5% 
 
